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TRIAL COURT BUDGETS, THE 
ENFORCER’S DILEMMA, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 
Scott Baker* 
Anup Malani** 
Legal and economic scholarship generally assumes that people 
weigh costs and benefits in responding to legal rules.  This same 
scholarship often assumes, however, that trial judges applying the law 
do not compare the costs and benefits of their own effort when im-
plementing legal rules.  Consideration of trial court effort results in 
the so-called enforcer’s dilemma, a similar problem that infects the 
decision of plaintiffs to bring suit.  Suppose the trial court devotes lots 
of its own effort in every case fully to minimize errors; it never triages 
the cases, dismissing on the pleadings or on summary judgment.  
Knowing, for example, that negligence is apt to result in liability, rela-
tively few will violate the legal rule if they could avoid doing so at a 
reasonable cost.  The pool of defendants causing accidents will then 
consist mainly of those who were nonnegligent.  Understanding as 
much, the trial court should not waste its own effort or judicial time 
confirming what it knows to be true. Instead, the trial court has an in-
centive to deviate, to dismiss the cases after a cursory investigation, 
contradicting our initial assumption about the trial court’s behavior.  
Given this profitable deviation, game theorists say that looking close-
ly at every case that comes in the courthouse door cannot be an equi-
librium.  Instead, with trial courts operating under budget constraints 
we demonstrate that the only equilibrium involves treating like cases 
differently.  Given the same facts, sometimes the court looks closely at 
the merits, meaning they let the case proceed beyond dismissal or 
summary judgment. Other times they do not.  Yet this trial court strat-
egy is inconsistent with the rule of law.  After pointing out this persua-
sive feature of ex post adjudication, the conclusion turns to appellate 
review as a possible fix.  It turns out that this “fix” suffers the same 
problem. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A central goal of legal scholarship is to predict the consequences of 
legal rules and make claims about which rules improve well-being or 
promote welfare, however construed.  Much of that scholarship, especial-
ly research by writers with a law and economics bent, assumes that hu-
man actors subject to the law make decisions by comparing the costs and 
benefits of their behavior.  The same scholarship, however, and quite pe-
culiarly, often ignores that the implementation of legal rules is done by 
judges who themselves are human and engage in cost-benefit analysis.1 
For example, the trial judge in a civil case must decide whether to 
let a case continue or resolve it on a preliminary motion.  In making 
these choices the trial judge will likely ask whether the cost of exerting 
more of his own effort to keep the case on his docket is justified by the 
decrease in the likelihood of a mistake.  To make this effort calculation 
the trial judge will use information about the kinds of cases that typically 
appear in litigation, they will be “rational” in the allocation of their own 
effort.2 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. There is a growing legal and political science literature on the behavior of judges, as well as 
politicians who write statutory rules.  Much of that literature is focused on the (political) preferences 
of judges, not the sort of cost-benefit analysis we discuss here.  Some, most notably Judge Posner, have 
suggested treating judges as utility maximizing agents with preferences for leisure. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 59–60 (2008) (“Most people who seek or accept a judgeship derive 
more utility from leisure and public recognition, relative to income, . . . judges having a taste for lei-
sure can indulge their tastes more easily than they could as practicing lawyers.”).  
 2. Economists have known about the enforcer’s dilemma for a long time.  DREW FUDENBERG 
& JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 17–18 (1991).  Within law, a variant of the enforcer’s dilemma has 
been identified in discussions about whether plaintiff has an incentive to bring cases to trial.  Scholars 
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Taking explicit account of such cost-benefit calculations by judges 
that implement the law alters some predictions from prior law and eco-
nomics scholarship.  First, many legal rules have weaker incentive effects 
than previously thought.  Starting with Janusz Ordover’s model,3 scholars 
have recognized that plaintiffs will only bring suit if there is a sufficient 
chance that they face a negligent defendant and thus some recovery 
could be forthcoming.  Thus, the fact that plaintiffs bear a cost of filing 
suit means that the negligence regime deterrence must be less than per-
fect.4  The natural solution is to have the government commit to bringing 
the suit irrespective of its beliefs on the merits or to subsidize private 
lawsuits.5  Our insight is that such solutions will not work if the trial court 
also bears a cost of effort.  Even if suit is assured, the enforcer’s dilemma 
simply moves to another actor, the trial courts. 
Specifically, cost-benefit analysis causes trial courts to economize—
reduce—the effort they put into evaluating or triaging particular cases 
because they anticipate that the legal rule has achieved some deterrence, 
making it likely that a defendant is blameless.  Potential defendants, 
however, also anticipate the court’s behavior, reducing the effort they 
put into complying with the law.  This dynamic leads to less compliance 
by both court and noncourt actors overall. 
Second, the application of law by the trial court will lack consisten-
cy, meaning like cases will not be treated alike.  A comparison to the 
scholarship where plaintiffs bear a cost of filing a lawsuit is again fruitful.  
There the equilibrium often involves the plaintiff sometimes suing and 
sometimes not—an inconsistency in the filing of lawsuits.6  But that is not 
the only problem.  Assuming that problem is fixed another one pops up: 
discriminatory treatment by trial courts. 
In our model discriminatory judicial treatment arises not for the 
usual reason, different judicial preferences.  Instead, it arises because 
there is continual dependency between how judges allocate their effort at 
evaluating cases during the preliminary stages of adjudication and how 
noncourt actors behave.  If defendants allocate more effort to obeying 
                                                                                                                                      
suggest that there must be some negligent defendants in the pool of tortfeasors for a lawsuit by a plain-
tiff to be cost-justified.  See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the 
Negligence Standard, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1993); Janusz A. Ordover, Costly Litigation in the Model 
of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 244–45 (1978).  As noted above, our contributions 
are to point out that (1) the equilibrium of the enforcer’s dilemma when applied to trial courts is in-
consistent with the rule of law; (2) the inconsistency is difficult if not impossible to combat by a rede-
sign of the court system or through new procedural or evidentiary rules; and (3) the issue arises across 
lots of different areas of law.  
 3. Id. at 244–45. 
 4. See id. at 251 (Proposition 1). 
 5. See id. at 254 (“It is equally easy to show that with negligible litigation costs there exist mixed 
equilibria in which the share of negligent agents in the total population is arbitrarily close to zero.”). 
 6. See Hylton, supra note 2, at 457 (showing that lawsuits only occur when the plaintiff’s 
harm—which is a random variable—exceeds a certain threshold, the threshold turns on the proportion 
of negligent defendants in the population); see also Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence Be-
tween the Private and Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613 (1997) 
(showing that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists where the plaintiff mixes between offering tough and 
weak settlements).  
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the law, judges allocate less to looking closely at their behavior in partic-
ular cases—they are more likely to simply dismiss the case on a motion 
rather than spend judicial resources on a trial.  But when courts investi-
gate defendants less, defendants allocate less effort to compliance.7  This 
cycling can continue ad infinitum. 
To make our claim concrete consider an example from tort law.  In 
fleshing out the negligence standard in torts many scholars endorse the 
Hand Formula8 which requires that courts hold defendants liable if the 
cost of the precaution is less than the expected harm, i.e., the probability 
of an accident times the harm from that accident. The Hand Formula 
presupposes that the trial court investigates the facts of each case and 
uncovers the cost of the precaution for the typical tortfeasor.  Based on 
this information the trial court determines whether the particular de-
fendant before it behaved reasonably.  If defendants thought that trial 
courts would always uncover the cost of the precaution, potential tortfea-
sors would take care—and avoid accidents—when it is cost effective for 
them to do so and not take care—and perhaps trigger accidents—when it 
is not cost effective for them to do so.9 
Yet if defendants acted in this manner, would a trial court always at-
tempt to uncover the cost of precaution?  If the trial court used cost-
benefit analysis to ration its own resources, the answer is no.  Because a 
potential tortfeasor’s expectation of a full court investigation ensures he 
takes any cost-justified precaution, the court will reason that the defend-
ant before it must not have taken precaution because its cost is greater 
than expected harm, i.e., the defendant is not liable.  Hence, the court 
can conserve its own resources without increasing mistakes by granting 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 
This economizing decision by the court, however, has a perverse 
feedback effect on the behavior of the potential tortfeasors.  Knowing 
that the court will always dismiss a negligence suit, potential tortfeasors 
will not take any care, even if cost-justified.10  Thus the Hand Formula—
                                                                                                                                      
 7. Of course, in the U.S. system, the trial court hears evidence from the litigants and does not 
actually conduct an investigation itself.  To be clear, we use the word “investigation” to refer to the 
trial court resources devoted to managing the case and having it on its docket—the triage decision by 
the trial court.  If the trial court dismisses the case on the pleadings or after summary judgment, it 
saves on the resources of overseeing a trial.  We say that is a failure to investigate because the trial 
court dismisses the case before all the evidence is heard.  It does so to clear its docket and thereby save 
time to do something else.  Of course, the trial court might also care about the social costs of having a 
trial; the costs of the juror’s time, for example.  The assumption here is that trials always lead to the 
correct resolution.  The assumption simplifies matters and allows us to focus on the resource allocation 
question.  
 8. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Richard A. Posner, A 
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). 
 9. For simplicity we assume here that all defendants have access to the same precaution, which 
could cost a lot or a little.  As we show in Part II.C, the analysis is not altered if it is assumed that some 
defendants cannot take precautions that the average defendant would find cost-justified. 
 10. Of course there is a secondary feedback effect on the inferences by rational courts as they 
will stop assuming that all defendants are innocent.  This will partly strengthen the deterrence effect of 
the negligence rule.  Yet that will have a tertiary feedback effect on potential tortfeasors behavior, and 
the cycle will repeat.  Ultimately courts will never go back to being impartial.  They will always put a 
thumb on the scale in favor of defendant’s innocence. 
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in the hands of a rational court—does not have the desired effect of in-
ducing efficient care decisions. 
Now take the logic back a step.  Whereas the trial court would grant 
summary judgment for a defendant if it thought the defendant expected 
to face a full investigation, the court would not grant summary judgment 
if it thought the defendant expected summary judgment.  Instead, the 
court might be tempted to investigate the defendant’s cost of precautions 
a bit more.  It would never make sense to investigate the defendant fully 
in every case.  As we have explained, the court wastes resources doing so 
if the defendant expected the court to fully investigate each case.  The 
only stable equilibrium is for the court to randomly choose a subset of 
cases to investigate, and for potential tortfeasors to make careful deci-
sions assuming only a subset of cases will be investigated.  Thus, with ra-
tional trial courts one should not expect like cases to be treated alike. 
Negligence is not the only area of law in which assuming cost-
benefit analysis by trial courts undermines the effectiveness of the legal 
rule.  There are other examples about which we will have much more to 
say, the law of self-defense, the enforceability of indefinite contractual 
agreements, and deference to agency interpretations of statute.11 
Our claim is not without limits.  The problem identified arises due 
to trial courts’ efforts to economize on their own judicial decision costs.  
Therefore, rules with low decision costs tend to be unaffected.  With such 
rules the trial court always spends the decision cost necessary to deter-
mine liability.  Noncourt actors understand they will do so and behave 
accordingly. Strict liability, for example, is cheaper for trial courts to im-
plement because it involves only verification that the defendant took 
some action and that the plaintiff suffered an injury.  There is no need to 
determine fault by the defendant.  Likewise, no liability rules tend to be 
robust.  Once investigation into defendant fault is required, however, tri-
al courts with limited resources will have trouble achieving equity even 
assuming that all accidents where liability could be found are brought to 
court. 
We have used the term “rational” interchangeably with trial courts 
anticipating the selection of cases before it and weighing the costs and 
benefits of their own effort.  Given that the term “rational” can have 
many connotations, we want to be precise about how we use the term.  
When we say that courts are rational we mean that their behavior satis-
fies three specific assumptions. 
The first assumption is that trial courts are not completely myopic in 
forming expectations, in particular, expectations about the value of ex-
erting greater effort on a given case.  We will speak of trial courts—and 
present a model of their behavior—as if they are fully sophisticated par-
                                                                                                                                      
 11. Wickelgren and Friedman show how Bayesian inferences by jurors place a cap on the 
amount of deterrence the criminal law can provide.  See Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 
Bayesian Juries and the Limits to Deterrence, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 70 (2006).  Our analysis builds to 
show that the problem is endemic to all appliers of law to facts and cannot be cured by appellate re-
view.    
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ties that use Bayes Rule to update beliefs.  Belief-formation by courts, 
however, raises problems, though perhaps to a lesser degree, even if the 
methodology courts employ is less than perfectly sophisticated.  All that 
is required for trouble is that courts pay some attention to the incentives 
of the legal rules they apply.  This is sufficient to encourage courts to ex-
ert less than full investigative effort in each case they hear: more precise-
ly, it is enough the judges understand that, say, most cases in a particular 
pool or brought by a particular attorney are weak and deserve little ef-
fort before they can be resolved, whereas most cases in a different pool 
of cases or brought by a different attorney are likely to be strong and de-
serving of deeper, more probing judicial scrutiny. 
The second assumption is that trial courts either have limited re-
sources or view their own effort as costly.  If trial courts had unlimited 
resources or suffered no cost when exerting effort, there would be no 
reason for public-minded courts not to fully investigate each case.  Im-
portantly, our argument does not rest on the assumption that courts are 
not publicly-minded.  All that is required is some tradeoff when a court 
devotes ceaseless attention to a particular case.  This tradeoff require-
ment is common both to our argument and to previous scholarship that 
endorses legal rules that balance decision costs and error costs.12 
The third assumption is that trial courts cannot precommit to inves-
tigate each case.  If trial courts could bind themselves to investigating 
each case, then rules like the Hand Formula would work as intended by 
law and economics scholars.  For that reason, the decision to precommit 
to full investigation of that rule may also be optimal.  It is only when 
courts cannot commit to investigation, when they have to make that deci-
sion after a particular case is filed, that full investigation becomes diffi-
cult to maintain and courts do not engage in it. 
Together these three assumptions imply two sorts of behavior.  
First, the kinds of cases that appear in litigation will often influence how 
the trial courts allocate scarce resources—whether they look closely at a 
case or not.  Second, anticipation of these choices will influence the be-
havior of potential plaintiffs and defendants which in turn will influence 
the cases that appear in litigation.  It is the interplay of these two behav-
iors that ultimately determines the effectiveness and ex post fairness of 
legal rules. 
What we find remarkable about our three assumptions about courts 
is not their validity, but rather that scholars make similar assumptions 
about parties subject to legal rules but not about parties implementing le-
gal rules.  Why the dissonance? 
Perhaps judges are able to commit to fully investigating every case 
or can be forced to do so by rules of procedure and evidence.  This ex-
planation is plausible but ultimately unconvincing to us.  There is a great 
deal of psychological research that questions the ability of individuals to 
                                                                                                                                      
 12. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 9 (1999).  
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self-commit, and that research does not exempt judges and jurors from 
its scope.  Moreover, there are numerous examples where courts take in-
to account the process by which cases are selected for trial.  For example, 
much of the death-is-different jurisprudence in criminal procedure is 
premised on concerns about the process by which capital cases are manu-
factured and prosecuted.  In exploring the normative implications of our 
critique we are largely pessimistic.  No evidentiary rule can shield trial 
judges from information about case selection—that is, about the kinds of 
activities that result in lawsuits.  In addition, judges have the opportunity 
to learn.  If they see, for example, a particular agency putting politics 
ahead of expertise, they will find it more difficult to defer over time es-
pecially if the rationale for deference is agency expertise. 
Perhaps a second option is to devise procedural and substantive 
rules that are more conducive to rational behavior by judges, rules that 
both allow the trial court to make rational inferences from all available 
facts and yet ensure that noncourt actors behave appropriately before lit-
igation starts.  This leads to an insight, the law should make room for ap-
pellate courts to influence the allocation of trial court resources.  By 
making motions easier or harder to grant, the appellate court can affect 
how trial courts spend resources, which in turn can provide the all-
important commitment power.  It is not enough, in other words, for the 
appellate court to specify an efficient legal rule and punish trial courts for 
making mistakes.  The appellate court must also punish the trial court for 
resolving cases too early.  And that is true even if such a resolution re-
flects the best allocation of trial court resources ex post.  As we note in 
the Conclusion, however, such a punishment scheme by the appellate 
court also suffers from the enforcer’s dilemma, so the solution will fall 
short. 
The upshot, we think, is a cautionary note.  Because judges imple-
ment the law in a cost-beneficial manner, the potential efficiency of legal 
rules is limited and there will be a tendency for the judiciary to treat like 
cases differently.  The conclusion is drawn after we stack the deck in fa-
vor of making judge-made law work well.  That is to say, we assume that 
all other conditions required to ensure rules ensure good behavior by le-
gal subjects are present, e.g., the absence of judgment proofness, judicial 
error, the defendant’s private information, and, most importantly, the 
fact that filing a lawsuit is costly.13  It is also true even if judges have the 
best of intentions, i.e., are nonpartisan, faithful to the law, and public-
minded. 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. On the difficulties created by judgment-proofness, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230–32 (2004); Yeon-Koo Che & Kathyrn E. Spier, Strategic Judgment 
Proofing, 39 RAND J. ECON. 926 (2008).  On overcoming some of the difficulties created by judicial 
error, see generally I. P. L. Png, Note, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Er-
ror, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 101 (1986).  On the difficulties created when the defendant have private 
information about the cost of fabricating evidence, see generally Chris William Sanchirco & George 
Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Perfor-
mance, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 72 (2007).  
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Part II of this Article recounts the logic behind our claim that ra-
tional trial court behavior can undermine the incentive effect of legal 
rules.  Although we focus on the negligence example.  Part III documents 
a number of other legal rules that work as intended only if courts imple-
menting them fail to update their beliefs about the merits of the case be-
fore them in light of the fact that the law has achieved some deterrence. 
Part IV, in conclusion, discusses the normative implications of our 
claim.  We explain our skepticism that further regulation of trial courts 
can (1) resurrect the incentives legal rules provide noncourt actors and 
(2) ensure the consistent application of law.  We also, as discussed earli-
er, note a subtle take away from our analysis: the importance of allowing 
appellate courts to influence the allocation of trial court resources.  By 
making motions easier or harder to grant, the appellate court can affect 
how trial courts spend resources, which, in turn, can provide the all-
important commitment power.  In closing, we spend some time consider-
ing whether appellate review of trial court behavior could successfully 
check and solve the enforcer’s dilemma identified in the main body of 
the Article.  An appendix contains a model formally demonstrating the 
logic of the claims made in the text. 
II. BASIC EXAMPLE: NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY 
To illustrate the logic of the argument we begin with perhaps the 
seminal example of how common law legal rules can promote efficient 
behavior, the negligence standard in tort.  Under that liability standard a 
tortfeasor is liable for an accident if it fails to take “reasonable care.”14  
The classic law and economics account of negligence defines reasonable 
care as Judge Hand did in Carroll Towing—cost justified precautions.15  
More precisely, if the cost to the typical firm of taking care to avoid an 
accident (often denoted by ܤ) costs less than the expected loss from an 
accident (often denoted by ݌ܮ), then the care is reasonable.16  If taking 
care costs more than the expected loss, then it is not reasonable.17  A 
court should hold a tortfeasor liable in the former case but not the latter. 
The Hand Formula leads to efficient care by potential tortfeasors 
if—and only if—trial courts implement that tort standard in a somewhat 
irrational manner, i.e., doing so while ignoring courts duty to efficiently 
manage judicial resources. 
Consider the following example involving storeowners.  Following a 
snowstorm there is a chance that a patron will slip and fall if the sidewalk 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Re-
view of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 595 (2002) (collecting jury instruction and 
noting, as an example, a New York jury instruction stating “[n]egligence is lack of ordinary care.  It is a 
failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used under the same 
circumstances”).  Kelley & Wendt provide references to other similar instructions used in other states. 
Id. at note 24.  
 15. United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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in front of a store is not shoveled.  The expected cost of the accident is 
$30, where p=1/5 and L=150.  For the typical storeowner shoveling the 
walk can either be expensive (costing $50) or cheap (costing $5).  Each 
cost arises with the equal probability (1/2).  Storeowners know whether 
shoveling is cheap or expensive.18  Storeowners, after all, are in the indus-
try.  They have ready access to information about precautions such as 
this.  In contrast, the trial court must hold a bench trial to uncover this 
information.  For simplicity, assume that the trial court can at a cost of 
$10 discover the cost of the typical storeowner’s precaution with perfect 
accuracy.19 
Some legal authority—the appellate court or a statute—instructs the 
trial court to find defendants negligent if they fail to take cost-justified 
precautions.  Substantial prior scholarship suggests that the negligence 
rule, under some conditions, minimizes the sum of administrative costs, 
accident costs, and precautions costs.20  The twist we add is that the legal 
authority needs the trial court to implement the negligence rule. 
Trial courts care about getting things right—avoiding mistaken con-
viction or mistaken exoneration.21  This could either be because they are 
truly publicly minded or they just want to avoid the shame of appellate 
reversal.  Suppose, however, they also care about the cost of operating 
their own courts. Like the storeowners the trial court is rational. It 
spends resources on mistake avoidance when it is cost justified to do so. 
Presumably the trial court cares more about big mistakes than small 
mistakes.  To capture this effect suppose that the trial court’s loss from a 
mistake is the difference between the cost of high-cost precaution and 
the accident cost ($50–$30 or $20), and the trial court’s loss from a mis-
taken exoneration is the difference between the accident cost and the 
cost of the low-cost precaution ($30–$5 or $25). 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. In this example, we assume that all storeowners are typical; specifically, they either all have 
access to the low cost precaution or to the high cost precaution, each event occurs ½ of the time.  Thus, 
we embed the “objective” standard for tort in the example.  See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 
490 (1837) (C.P.) (“Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be coextensive 
with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each indi-
vidual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a 
man of ordinary prudence would observe.”). No defendant can argue that they were “atypical”, with 
precautions different from their peers.  The court, as noted, doesn’t know whether precaution costs for 
the typical storeowner was low or high.  It only observes the accident. 
 19. Of course, in the U.S. system, the trial court hears evidence from the litigants and does not 
actually conduct an investigation itself.  To be clear, we use the word “investigation” to refer to the 
trial court resources devoted to managing the case and having it on its docket—the triage decision by 
the trial court.  If the trial court dismisses the case on the pleadings or after summary judgment, it 
saves on the resources of overseeing a trial.  We say that is a failure to investigate because the trial 
court dismisses the case before all the evidence is heard.  It does so to clear its docket and thereby save 
time to do something else.  Of course, the trial court might also care about the social costs of having a 
trial; the costs of the juror’s time, for example.  The assumption here is that trials always lead to the 
correct resolution.  The assumption simplifies matters and allows us to focus on the resource allocation 
question.   
 20. GUIDO CALABRASI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Verses Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24–25 (1980).  
 21. Although we are discussing civil law judgments, we use the terms appropriate for criminal 
law judgments, because they are more succinct. 
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In what follows two scenarios are considered.  In the first, the trial 
court is able to commit, before an accident even occurs, to expending re-
sources on learning whether the cost of precaution was high or low in 
every case it hears.  In the second case, the one of more interest to us, the 
trial court cannot commit to spend resources in this manner in all cases.  
This latter scenario corresponds to the normal course of events where 
the trial court chooses whether to investigate after the defendant decides 
whether to take precautions, and if an accident materializes the plaintiff 
brings a case to the court. 
A. Trial Courts Can Commit 
Suppose that a court can precommit to investigate every case 
brought to court before those cases occur.  What would the expected 
benefit to the court be with such a precommitment strategy?  A store-
owner would make their choice in light of the court’s precommitment to 
spend resources on every case, including their case, and the perfect accu-
racy of the court’s investigation.  She knows that liability will follow if the 
precaution costs turn out to be low and she fails to take it.  As a result, 
she takes precautions if the costs happen to be low (since expected dam-
ages of $30 exceed the costs of $5).  She forgoes precautions when they 
are expensive (since costs of $50 exceed the expected damages of $30).  
The court must pay $10 for every case that is brought.  However, only 
half of the time do storeowners fail to take precaution (that is, the per-
centage of times that the “typical” precaution is expensive).  And it is on-
ly in those cases that customers suffer slip and fall accidents and are sued.  
Thus the expected loss to the court is $5. 
If, instead, the trial court decided not to precommit to investigating 
whether precautions were cost-justified in each case, it has two potential 
options.  First, it might commit to declaring, without doing any investiga-
tion, that no reasonable storeowner would invest in precaution, implying 
that slip and fall accidents result in no liability.  Anticipating dismissal on 
the pleading storeowners will always fail to take precautions.  Customers 
slip and fall in front of each store and each storeowner is sued.  Follow-
ing through on its strategy the trial court mistakenly exonerates one-half 
of defendants.  The trial court’s loss from this strategy is the probability 
precautions are low cost (1/2) multiplied by the loss from mistaken exon-
eration ($25) resulting in an expected loss to the court of $12.50 per case. 
Alternatively, the trial court might commit to declaring as a matter 
of law that all reasonable storeowners would always take precaution im-
plying strict liability for slip and fall accidents.  Anticipating liability 
storeowners will take precautions when they have low cost (since ex-
pected damages of $30 exceed the precaution cost of $5) and not when 
they have high cost (since cost of $50 exceeds the expected damages of 
$30).  Only half the storefronts have slip and fall accidents and that half 
of storeowners are sued.  Following through on its strategy the trial court 
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mistakenly convicts in all cases, and it suffers a loss of $20 per case.  This 
results in an expected loss to the court of $10. 
Comparing the three losses, precommitting to investigate each case 
generates the smallest expected loss ($5) to the court.  Therefore, the tri-
al court finds it optimal to commit to investigate. 
B. Trial Courts Cannot Commit 
Suppose now that the trial court cannot commit to investigate each 
case before it arises.  Instead the court must make its investigation deci-
sion after a storeowner decides whether to take precautions, an accident 
occurs, and a case is brought.  In other words, the trial court makes its in-
vestigation decision in light of the distribution of cases that appear in 
court.  Suppose the Hand Formula worked as intended.  The defendant 
takes precautions when they cost $5 and fails to take precautions when 
they cost $50.  Accidents arise and suits are brought.  The trial court un-
derstands that accidents occur only when the typical defendant has access 
to high cost precautions. 
At that point what should the trial court do?  It could spend $10 and 
learn that defendant did, in fact, face a high precaution cost.  But why 
would the trial court spend money confirming what it already knows?  
The trial court, instead, has an incentive to simply rule that there is no 
factual question and that the defendant is not liable. 
Such a ruling, however, generates a feedback effect.  Anticipating 
dismissal of all cases, no storeowner would take precaution even if pre-
caution costs were low.  Of course, the rational court—being rational—
would anticipate this response.  It would no longer hold all defendants 
not liable because there is a chance that shop owners would fail to take 
cost-justified precautions.  But the court would not behave like the trial 
court with commitment—always investigating.  Instead, the court would 
oscillate back and forth between investigating and not investigating the 
cases.  The law, as applied by the trial court, will appear to be arbitrary 
or random. 
To see why, consider the stability of three trial court strategies: (1) 
declaring all defendants not liable, (2) investigating the merits of the case 
every time; (3) investigating the merits in 1/6th of the cases and holding 
the defendant not liable as a matter of law in all other cases. 
1. Declare All Defendants Not Liable 
Suppose that the trial court always finds defendants not liable with-
out conducting an investigation.  No defendant would take care.  The tri-
al court’s expected loss is $12.50 for reasons similar to those given in Sec-
tion A.  The trial court can do better by investigating the merits of the 
case and avoiding the mistaken exoneration.  That strategy results in a 
loss for the trial court of $10.  Since investigation generates a higher pay-
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off for the trial court than declaring all defendants not liable, we can re-
ject that strategy as part of an equilibrium. 
2. Investigate the Merits in Each Case 
If the court investigated all cases, the shop owner would fail to take 
care when precautions costs were high and take precaution when costs 
were low.  If she did not and there was an accident, the court would in-
vestigate her and discover she had low precaution costs.  She would be 
held liable and suffer expected damages of $30.  It would be cheaper for 
her to take care for $5.  The court’s rational inference upon seeing an ac-
cident but before undertaking an investigation is that the defendant must 
not be liable.  The court knows what to do to avoid a mistake before it 
even investigates.  As noted, the rational court would not want to spend 
money confirming what it already knows.22  The trial court should simply 
find the defendant not liable as a matter of law.  We can thus also reject 
the “investigate-always” strategy as part of an equilibrium. 
3. Investigate the Merits in 1/6 of Cases 
Finally, suppose that the trial court investigates the merits of 1/6th 
of the cases involving an accident.  In the other cases, the court grants the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, finding them 
not liable.  When faced with a high precaution cost the shop owner would 
not take care.  But when facing a low precaution cost, the shop owner 
fails to take care 2/3rds of the time. 
Why?  Facing a low cost of precaution, the shop owner receives the 
same payoff as if she does not, so she would have no incentive to take 
care more or less often.  To see this, note that if the shop owner takes 
care, she incurs a cost of $5 for sure and prevents the accident for sure.  If 
she does not take care, her payoff depends on whether the accident oc-
curs and whether the court investigates—i.e., does not resolve the case in 
the defendant’s favor on the motion to dismiss.  If she does not take the 
low cost precaution, the defendant expected loss depends on (1) whether 
the accident transpires (which occurs with probability 1/5); (2) whether 
the trial court investigates the accident and discovers that the defendant 
faced a low cost of precaution (which occurs with probability 1/6); (3) the 
damages the defendant must then pay ($150).  The shop owner’s ex-
pected payoff from a failure to take the available low cost precaution is 
$5 (i.e., 1/5 x 1/6 x $150). 
Notice also that if the shop owner fails to take care 2/3rd of the 
time, the court’s best response is to investigate 1/6 of the cases.  In other 
words, the court cannot increase its payoff by investigating in more or 
fewer cases.  The loss from investigating a case is $10.  The court’s ex-
pected loss from a failure to investigate is the chance of a mistaken exon-
                                                                                                                                      
 22. See discussion supra Part I.  
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eration times the loss from a mistaken exoneration.  In this example the 
chance of a mistaken exoneration is 2/5 (given that care is never taken 
when costs are high and not taken when costs are low 2/3 of the time).23  
The expected loss from a failure to investigate is thus 2/5 times 25, or $10.  
The court has no incentive to change its rate of investigation. 
Naturally the numbers we have generated are arbitrary.  In the ap-
pendix we provide a more general game theoretic model of the interac-
tion.  If the cost of care was different, if the court’s cost of investigation 
was different, if the court’s weight placed on mistakes, or if the cost of an 
accident was different, the shop owner facing low costs would take care 
and the court would investigate cases with different probabilities.24 
Before concluding we can add one more wrinkle to the analysis.  Up 
to this point we have assumed that it was costless for the plaintiff to file 
suit.  Thus, each time an accident materialized, the defendant faced a 
suit.  The only question was whether the trial court was apt to dismiss the 
case or let it proceed to trial.  Suppose now that the plaintiff had a cost of 
filing suit of $8.  Would she do so given the behavior of the defendant 
and the anticipated behavior of the trial court?  The answer is yes.  Of 
the defendants who cause accidents, 2/5 had a low cost of precaution and 
as a result would be found liable if the trial court investigated.  Upon a 
finding of liability, the plaintiff is awarded his loss, which in our example 
is $150.  Finally, the trial court investigates 1/6 of the time.  Thus, the ex-
pected recovery for the plaintiff from filing suit is 2/5*1/6*150 or $10.  
Since the expected benefit exceeds the cost of filing suit, the plaintiff al-
ways files. 
Two lessons can be drawn from our example.  First, in the equilibri-
um wherein a trial court makes its effort decision after a case is brought 
the shop owner takes the low cost precaution only a fraction of the time.  
Assuming trial courts efficiently manage resources to avoid mistakes 
changes the incentive story used to justify the Hand Formula.  As in the 
case with costly litigation, the result involves less deterrence than pre-
dicted by the Hand Formula. 
Note all the things the model assumed away, many of which other 
scholars have suggested lead to under-deterrence.  Individuals did not 
fail to understand when liability would attach.25  The court did not have 
trouble detecting whether the accident occurred.  The court did not fear 
chilling socially valuable behavior and as a result set the sanction lower 
than necessary to deter all harmful behavior.26  For the bulk of the analy-
                                                                                                                                      
 23. The low cost type of defendant fails to take care sixty-six percent of the time.  The high cost 
type always fails to take care.  Given these strategies, the probability that an accident resulted from the 
failure of the low-cost type to take care is given by Bayes rule. 
 
 24. See the analysis in the appendix. 
 25. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on the Compliance with 
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974–94 (1984) (noting that uncertain legal standards can, under 
certain conditions, lead to underdeterrence).   
 26. See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 763 (2012). 
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sis lawsuits were costless to file eliminating the problems raised by  
Ordover.27  We rigged it to give the Hand Formula the best chance at 
success of inducing efficient care decisions.  It did not happen. 
The inefficiency cannot be fixed by increasing the sanction.  Such a 
move cures underdeterrence but leads to overdeterrence.  Suppose that 
the court increased the sanction to $1000.  Then the shop owner would 
always take precautions.  But that is inefficient.  When precautions are 
quite expensive, they should not be deployed because the precaution 
costs outweigh the expected losses from the accident.28 
The second lesson is that a legal system with rational trial courts and 
rational litigants can lead to arbitrary application of law to facts.  Under 
the assumption that lawsuits are costless to file, cases with identical facts 
will be decided differently.  In one case the court may allow defendants 
and plaintiffs to present evidence (i.e., what we refer to as spending re-
sources to investigate the merits).  In the next case it may resolve the 
case for the defendant without hearing any evidence.  The defendant an-
ticipates and incorporates this varying application of law to the facts into 
his decision making process when it comes to care.  And, indeed the arbi-
trariness in the trial court system induces people to take care a fraction 
of the time when the cost of precaution is low. 
In other words different judicial preferences are not needed to get 
like cases treated differently.29  It can be the consequence of the reaction 
and counterreaction of trial courts and litigants.  To generate a predicta-
ble legal system might therefore require restricting the ability of trial 
courts to make inferences from the selection of cases into litigation.  It 
might also require that the appellate court make rules about procedure 
dictating how a trial court spends investigation resources.  That is, how 
easy it is for the trial court to resolve cases on a motion.  Neither is easy 
to do because enforcement of these checks by the appellate court with 
limited resources raises the same enforcer’s dilemma problem. 
III. ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES 
This Part provides a number of other examples where rational 
courts that make decisions about allocation of attention to cases after 
they arise, i.e., lack the ability to precommit, are unable to achieve effi-
ciency or treat like cases alike.  The examples are drawn from a wide 
range of legal areas.  Our intent is not to be exhaustive but rather give a 
flavor of the way our analysis might apply across fields. 
                                                                                                                                      
 27. Ordover, supra note 2. 
 28. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972) (“It may be 
the cost of installing safety equipment or otherwise making the activity safer, or the benefit forgone by 
curtailing or eliminating the activity.  If the cost of safety measures or of curtailment—whichever cost 
is lower—exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would 
be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention.”). 
 29. For a model showing that discriminatory treatment of cases can result from judicial learning, 
see Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence, 120 J. POL. ECON. 513 
(2012).  
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A. Self-Defense 
Criminal offenses define activities society wishes to deter.  Defenses 
define circumstances where, despite the occurrence of the crime, the law 
chooses not to hold the defendant responsible.  Defenses include necessi-
ty, duress, insanity, and self-defense.  The theory behind defenses is that, 
even though the crime transpired, society feels that the punishment 
should not be dispensed.30  Sometimes the crime is said to be justified, 
while other times the crime is said to be excused.31  For our purposes 
what matters is that criminal defenses embody a value choice.  Defenses 
allow the legal system to judge conduct that is typically destructive but 
not worthy of punishment in specific cases. 
As criminal law scholars long ago recognized, the trouble is not the 
existence of defenses, but rather their application.32  Every person who 
commits, say, assault has an incentive to claim self-defense.  The task of 
the legal system is to determine what conduct falls into the class of de-
fenses and what conduct does not. 
Consider two types of assault: the first involving actual self-defense 
and the second a false claim of self-defense.  The assault involving actual 
self-defense cannot be avoided.  The defendant strikes because he har-
bors a legitimate fear of bodily injury.  The assault involving the false 
claim of self-defense can be avoided.  The second defendant could have 
used language to diffuse the situation or walked away.  The defendant 
himself knows whether he truly acted in self-defense.  The court must 
spend social and judicial resources to uncover this fact.  It must hold a 
trial and let witnesses testify. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, defendants believe the trial 
court will allow any case brought by the prosecutor to potentially go to 
trial.  The trial court will never push for settlement or hint to the prose-
cutor that she should drop the case.  Those actions can be thought of as 
investigation costs (the spending of judicial resources to find out what 
happened).  Knowing that he will never be let off the hook, the second 
                                                                                                                                      
 30. See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 958 (1985) 
(“A justification negates an assertion of wrongful conduct.  An excuse negates a charge that the par-
ticular defendant is personally to blame for the wrongful conduct.”).  Whether the defense comes in 
the form of an excuse or a justification, society does not punish behavior it normally would. 
 31. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1897, 1900 (1984) (discussing the difference between excuse and justification). 
 32. In 1984 Meir Dan-Cohen expressed the difficulty as follows:  
For centuries criminal lawyers have been troubled by the question whether duress should operate 
as a defense to a criminal charge.  Some have maintained that, even when external pressures im-
pel an individual toward crime, the law should by no means relax its demand that the individual 
make the socially correct choice.  If anything, the opposite is the case: “[I]t is at the moment when 
temptation to crime is strongest that the law should speak most clearly and emphatically to the 
contrary.”  Proponents of the defense, by contrast, have emphasized the unfairness of punishing a 
person for succumbing to pressures to which even his judges might have yielded.  These conflict-
ing arguments seem to impale the law on the horns of an inexorable dilemma.  The law faces a 
hopeless trade-off between the competing values of deterrence and compassion (or fairness); 
whichever way it resolves the question of duress, it must sacrifice one value to the other.   
Meir Dan Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 625, 632–33 (1984) (internal citation omitted). 
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defendant is deterred.  That is to say, sufficiently fearing application of 
criminal sanctions, that defendant backs down in his encounter.  The first 
defendant by assumption cannot be deterred.  This resolution is efficient.  
Those defendants who can avoid assaulting their aggressor do so.  De-
fendants who cannot, do not. 
But, after the fact, the trial court will want to let all defendants off 
the hook.  It will want to push the prosecutor for leniency.  It will want to 
use the powers of judicial discretion to attempt to avoid a trial.  The rea-
son is that it knows that the defendant is not guilty.  The trial court’s in-
centive to push the prosecutor to drop the case or recommend a gener-
ous plea offer does not flow from the familiar reason that, ex post, 
sanctioning defendants is often inefficient.33  Rather, the trial court has 
limited resources and, as a result, does not want to spend its time and re-
sources holding a trial in an attempt to figure out which defendants are 
guilty and which ones are innocent unless such expenditures are cost jus-
tified.  If most defendants will have valid self-defense claims, as predicted 
in the last paragraph, such expenditures are not worthwhile.  The trial 
court should instead push for settlement or push for the prosecutor to 
drop the case before any evidence is taken.  Yet the anticipation of these 
actions ruins the deterrent effect of the sanction, undermining the predic-
tion of the past paragraph. 
If trial courts invest their limited resources for holding trials in the 
validity of self-defense claims until the marginal benefit of that invest-
ment equals its marginal cost, a stable equilibrium will track our negli-
gence example.  The first defendant commits assault.  The second de-
fendant, however, assaults sometimes and not others.  Moreover, the 
legal system sometimes investigates the defendant’s circumstances (i.e., 
holds a trial), while other times it exonerates him without investigation 
(the prosecutor drops the case or settles for a small penalty).  We have 
again arbitrariness in the application of law to facts. 
B. Indefinite Contractual Agreements 
At common law, an agreement lacking an essential term was 
deemed too indefinite to enforce.  The modern approach relaxes the 
common law rule.  Article 2 of the UCC, for example, instructs the court 
to enforce an agreement if the parties had an intent to contract and there 
exists a reasonably certain basis for giving a remedy.34 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. See David Friedman, Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment, 107 J. 
POL. ECON. 259, 260 (1999) (“For a simple example, consider an offense currently punished by a 10-
year prison term imposed on offenders with a probability of .6.  The certainty equivalent to the crimi-
nal of that punishment lottery is the same as the certainty equivalent of some lower probability of exe-
cution—say .1.  Obviously a reform is in order.  We shut down the prison.  Every time we convict a 
criminal, we roll a die: 1–5 we let him go, 6 we hang him.”); see also Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: 
Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 753 (1999) (“After all, courts send people to jail even 
though this is ex post socially inefficient.”).  
 34. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978).  
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Some scholars argue that the purpose of the indefiniteness doctrine 
is to avoid cost-shifting from private contracting parties to publicly subsi-
dized courts.35  Contracting parties know better than courts what they 
want.36  If possible, parties should fill in the terms ex ante rather than foist 
the duty on courts.37  A refusal to enforce indefinite agreements encour-
ages contractual completeness easing the burden on the court. 
That said, contracts may be incomplete because parties failed to re-
alize they had left a gap.  Alternatively, filling the gap might not be worth 
it given, say, a low probability that the contingency governed by the gap 
will materialize.38  In those cases strict application of the indefiniteness 
doctrine frustrates the parties’ intention.  It makes sense for the court to 
fill in the gap ex post rather than have the parties do it ex ante. 
In the language of efficiency we want trial courts to fill in gaps 
where it is cost-effective for them to do so (either because the contingen-
cy is rare or could not have been anticipated).  At the same time trial 
courts should refuse to fill gaps where the parties could have cheaply 
completed the terms at the contracting stage. 
Supposing that the trial court has limited resources and an inability 
to commit fully to investigating all cases complicates this simple efficien-
cy story.  Suppose one pair of contracting parties faces a high cost of 
completion, while a second pair faces a low cost of completion.  Follow-
ing our by-now-familiar practice, suppose also that the trial court does 
not know the actual cost faced by the contracting pair absent spending an 
investigation cost. 
The sort of investigation we envision that trial courts might under-
take is similar to that in, for example, Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. 
v. Schumacher.39  In that case the parties agreed to agree on the renewal 
rate for a lease agreement.40  The court refused to enforce the agreement, 
however, reasoning that the parties failed to provide a way to fix the 
rate.41  It noted in passing how the parties could have made the court’s 
task easier by, say, conditioning the payment on a recourse to an “objec-
tive extrinsic event, condition or standard on which the amount was 
made to depend.”42 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 97 (1989) (“This justification—that ex ante contracting can be 
cheaper than ex post litigation—can also explain the common law’s broader rule that ‘for a contract to 
be binding the terms of the contract must be reasonably certain and definite.’” (internal citation omit-
ted)). 
 36. Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 26 (A. 
Mitch Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds. 2007) (“[I]nterferences or restrictions on the contract the parties 
sign cannot increase the Pareto efficiency of the contracted-for outcome; that is, there should be free-
dom of contract if the only welfare issue is the efficiency of the outcome achieved by the contract from 
the perspectives of the parties to the contract.”).  
 37. Aryes & Gertner, supra note 35, at 97. 
 38. See Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
289, 290 (2006).  
 39. 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981). 
 40. Id. at 542. 
 41. Id. at 544. 
 42. Id. 
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Back to our hypothetical, imagine that the court commits to investi-
gate the circumstances of the contract in every case.  It then fills in the 
terms as the parties intended, but only if investigation reveals that the 
contracting costs were high—the parties could not have filled in the 
terms at a reasonable cost.  The low-cost contracting pairs fill in the 
terms: these contracts are not indefinite and do not end up in litigation.  
The high cost pairs fail to do so.  The court investigates and fills in the 
blanks for the high cost pair.  The court only helps—by filling in the 
terms—those who could not have done it themselves. 
Absent commitment, such a nice result cannot happen.  The court 
will worry that some “low cost” contracting are asking the court to fill in 
the gap when they really should have done it themselves.  Fearful of this 
fact, the court will, on occasion, decline to even ask what the parties in-
tended—that is to say, they will on occasion fail to complete the contract 
for the parties.  The low-cost pair on occasion will fill in terms them-
selves.  Other times they will refrain from doing so hoping to shift the 
cost onto the court. 
This equilibrium generates two predictions about the treatment of 
indefinite contracts.  First, courts will on occasion fill in an indefinite 
term even where there exists reasonable grounds for them to think the 
parties could have done so themselves.  This first prediction corresponds 
to the outcome where the court fails to investigate but the contracting 
pair had low completion cost.  Second, courts will apply the doctrine 
haphazardly—filling a gap in one contract although the contract is actual-
ly too indefinite while filling the same gap in another contract because it 
is not indefinite.43 
C. Agency Deference 
Administrative law rests many doctrines on the logic that agencies 
have policy expertise. For example, in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Counsel, Inc.44 the Supreme Court articulated its famous two-
step analysis for reviewing agency’s interpretation of statutes.  In the first 
step the court checks whether the relevant text of the organic statute be-
ing interpreted by an agency is ambiguous.45 
If so, the court in the second step approves the agency’s interpreta-
tion of that text so long as the interpretation is reasonable.46  In applying 
the test to the statutory term at issue in Chevron the Court nodded to 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. Some empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions.  See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1652–53 (2003) (comparing a random 
sample of indefiniteness cases) (“In thirty-four cases the court enforced the contract despite the de-
fendant’s claim that the agreement was indefinite.  In the remaining fifty-five cases the court denied 
enforcement, despite finding that the parties had concluded an agreement . . . .”). 
 44. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 45. Id. at 842–43. 
 46. Id. 
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agency expertise.47  Justice Breyer expanded on this notion in a First Cir-
cuit case decided shortly after Chevron.  In Mayburg v. Secretary of 
Health & Human Services, then Judge Breyer said that the amount of 
deference a court owes varies in proportion to the degree to which the 
question of law relates to “agency’s (rather than the court’s) administra-
tive or substantive expertise.”48  Statutory interpretation is not the only 
area where arguments about agency expertise hold sway.  In evaluating 
an agency rule where the science is uncertain, for example, the court typ-
ically defers to the agency reasoning that the agency is in a better posi-
tion to make judgment calls in areas of scientific uncertainty. 
Yet, on occasion the politics of the agency, rather than expertise, 
drive judgments about the interpretation of data in a rule-making proce-
dure or the agency’s interpretation of a statute.49  In that case judicial 
deference might not be warranted.  The issue is whether the court can 
maintain a commitment to defer.  Again, our analysis suggests that ab-
sent commitment doctrinal stability is hard to achieve. 
Consider a stylized example.  An issue—be it interpretation of a 
statute or approval of an agency rule—arises.  It is one of two types.  The 
first type is an issue that is resolved the same whether the agency deploys 
expertise or politics.  That is to say, in determining an issue—for exam-
ple, how a statute should be interpreted—an agency using expertise will 
reach the same answer as an agency using raw politics.  The second type 
of issue is one where the agency will reach different answers depending 
on whether it resolves the issue based on politics or expertise.  The trial 
court cannot tell simply from observing an outcome that accords with the 
agency preferences whether the agency based its decision on expertise or 
politics. By investigating—granting little deference—the trial court, how-
ever, learns which of the two types of issue was in play. 
The agency prefers that the trial court affirm its resolution of the is-
sue.  The trial court wants to prevent mistakes, if doing so is cost-
effective.  As in the negligence example, suppose the trial court must 
make its audit decision after it observes the outcome in the agency.  If 
the agency knew the trial court always deferred, the agency would always 
base its decisions on politics rather than expertise.  But then the trial 
court would not always want to defer.  On the other hand, if the agency 
through the trial court never deferred, i.e., it always investigated the is-
sue de novo, the agency would resolve all issues based on expertise.  Giv-
en this, the trial court would always want to defer after the fact.  So nei-
ther always investigating nor always deferring is a stable situation. 
                                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. at 865 (“Congress intended to accommodate both [competing] interests, but did not do so 
itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases.  Perhaps that body consciously desired the 
Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged 
with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so . . . .”). 
 48. Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 49. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 271, 281 (1986) (“The debate over the respective roles of ‘expertise’ and ‘politics' in agency deci-
sionmaking has proved to be one of the most persistent in administrative law.”).  
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This example demonstrates the difficulty of sticking with a con-
sistent level of agency deference.  The analysis predicts confusion in the 
doctrines surrounding review of agency decision making, an outcome 
that administrative law scholars have already observed.50 
We do not deny that doctrinal confusion might simply be the result 
of court confusion.  The federal bench does not know what the right an-
swer is.  But, in a more dynamic story one can see how a feedback loop 
via case selection might work.  To start, the court defers to agencies.  
Agencies—knowing they can now get away with political judgments—do 
so.  The court then sees a bunch of cases where it suspects the agency put 
politics above expertise and so shifts the doctrine back to a more sub-
stantive review, and the cycle continues. 
IV. ARE COURTS RATIONAL? 
We have shown that trial courts can undermine substantive legal 
rules if they are rational in certain ways.51  But are trial courts rational in 
these ways?  In particular do they to some extent consider incentive ef-
fects of legal rules, the case selection those effects imply, and their lim-
ited resources in deciding whether to allow a case to continue or not and 
in determining how much more evidence to hear before making a judg-
ment? 
To some extent scholars that propose legal rules for the incentive 
effects they have on the people on so-called primary behavior are es-
topped from disputing our assumption.52  When many of these scholars 
forecast the effect of a legal rule, they assume that the subjects of that 
rule are partly rational in the way we describe.53  They assume that these 
subjects are somewhat sophisticated in how they form beliefs about other 
actors and weight the costs and benefits of their own efforts.54  Why 
would trial courts not also be rational in the same way?  After all, judges 
are subject to the same rule when they are not casting judgment on liti-
gants.  If these persons are rational when a rule is applied to them, why 
are they not rational when they apply the rule to others? 
As for readers—scholarly or otherwise—who do not rely on ration-
al-actor models to analyze the effect of rules—there is no contradiction 
in doubting the rationality of courts.  Perhaps judges do not satisfy the 
rigorous standard for rationality upon which our central claim rests.  Al-
                                                                                                                                      
 50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006) (describing shifts in 
the application of the Chevron doctrine).  
 51. See supra Part II. 
 52. Every law and economics scholar makes this move.  
 53. Although not always defined with sufficient rigor, some form of rationality is the common 
assumption among law and economics scholars.  See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral 
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1998) (noting that behavioral law and econom-
ics sees law and economics as “handicapped by its commitment to the assumption that people are ra-
tional”). 
 54. For papers envisioning Bayesian updating of the type our trial court deploys, see Friedman 
& Wickelgren, supra note 11; Spier, supra note 6. 
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ternatively, even if these decision makers are capable of rationality, pro-
cedural rules governing the conduct of cases may limit their ability to act 
on inferences about case selection.  We take up these two possibilities in 
succession.  But first we offer some examples which show that courts, in 
more and less obvious ways, both understand that legal rules impact be-
havior and consider the likely quality of cases selected for litigation when 
deciding on the effort to be spent scrutinizing that case. 
A. Examples of Court Rationality 
The first piece of evidence that trial courts understand is that legal 
rules alter behavior, and, as a result, the distribution of litigated cases is 
the success of the law and economics movement.  That movement not 
only elevates the consequentialist approach to evaluating legal rules; it 
also forecasts consequences assuming people respond rationally to these 
rules.  Some of the leading lights of the movement Richard Posner, 
Frank Easterbrook, and Guido Calabresi are among the elite federal ap-
pellate court judges in the country.55  Judge Posner, in particular, is the 
most highly cited living appellate court judge, not just by academic au-
thors, but also by other judges.56 
It is not surprising then that the economic analysis of law now per-
vades court decision making.57  Courts regularly consider the rational re-
sponse to legal rules across common law fields such as tort, contract, 
criminal, and property, as well as more modern fields such as corporate 
law, consumer law58 and antitrust law.  They consider the incentive ef-
fects of negligence,59 strict liability60 and vicarious liability61 rules in tort 
cases,62 the effect of remedies in contracts63 and torts64 cases, the im-
                                                                                                                                      
 55. See, e.g., Dynamic Mach. Works, Inc. v. Mach. & Elec. Consultants, Inc. 352 F. Supp. 2d 83, 
84 (D. Mass. 2005) (calling Posner and Easterbrook among the nation’s “foremost jurists”). 
 56. We found 254 citations to Posner’s law and economics textbook THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW alone (search for “Economic Analysis of Law” in all cases database on Westlaw conducted 
July 6, 2012).   
 57. See, e.g., In re Perry Cnty. Foods, Inc., 313 B.R. 875, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Al. 2004) 
(“[E]mploying economic theory and analytical devises as a portion of the decisional processes for legal 
issues is an accepted practice by courts and legal commentators.”), and supporting citations therein. 
 58. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Foster Bancshares, Inc., 457 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Posner, J.) (exploring least cost avoider in forged check case). 
 59. See, e.g., MCI, LLC v. Patriot Eng’g & Envtl., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 
2007) (explaining incentive effect of Hand Formula); In re City of New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that since the common carrier has comparative advantage at protecting pas-
sengers, the duty of extraordinary care is justified—but that is captured in reasonableness standard in 
negligence). 
 60. See, e.g., O'Malley v. Am. LaFrance, Inc., No. 00-CV-1421 (ARR), 2002 WL 32068354, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2002) (discussing incentive effect of strict products liability).  
 61. See, e.g., Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Ky. 2005) (discussing incentive effects of 
respondeat superior liability).  
 62. See, e.g., In re Jones, 311 B.R. 647, 654 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2004) (noting that defendants con-
sider benefits and tort costs in decisions about precautions); Primus v. Alfred Sanzari Enterprises, 833 
A.2d 697, 704–05 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 2003) (noting that the purpose of tort liability is deterrence). 
 63. See, e.g., Spirit Locker, Inc., v. EVO Direct, LLC, 696 F. Supp. 2d 296, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(explaining the incentive effect of penalty clauses); Ortiz v. Lyon Mgmt. Grp., 157 Cal. App. 4th 604, 
619 n.11 (2007) (discussing concept of efficient breach). Dynamic Mach. Works, Inc. v. Mach. & Elec. 
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portance of both probability of apprehension and the penalty to the de-
terrence of crime,65 how limited liability blunts the incentive effects of 
tort and contract remedies,66 and the consequentialist rationale for vari-
ous property rules.67 
And it is not just the incentive effects of rules that they apply.  
Courts are aware of the incentive effects of contingency fee arrange-
ments68 and comprehend the occasional conflicts of interest between at-
torneys and clients.69  They understand that fee shifting statutes and the 
like affect which cases are brought to court.70 
Moreover, the wide array of court sources for citations in the foot-
notes for the last two paragraphs itself illustrates how widespread the 
consideration of incentive effects are in the judiciary.71  There are cita-
tions from federal courts and state courts at all levels.  This sort of analy-
sis can be found in published opinions as well as unpublished ones.  
Cherry picking is not required. 
Beyond the direct evidence that courts discuss incentives in debat-
ing legal rules, there is indirect evidence of the role that selection, in par-
ticular, plays in the level of scrutiny that courts employ in various areas 
of the law.  An initial example is constitutional criminal procedure, espe-
cially in capital cases, where concerns about the behavior of police in in-
vestigating cases, prosecutors in filing cases, and prior state courts in 
hearing cases have led both subsequent and higher courts to interpreta-
tions of constitutional rights and remedies such as the exclusionary rule 
and new trials to encourage better case selection and processing on the 
part of police and prosecutors.72  These procedural rules are designed to 
                                                                                                                                      
Consultants, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89 (D. Mass. 2005) (noting that contract remedies deter oppor-
tunistic behavior). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the in-
centive effects of restitution remedy in tort); Jones v. Reagan, 696 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1983) (ob-
serving that punitive damages can cause overdeterrence); Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, 862 F. 
Supp. 2d 551, 553–54 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (noting that reforming the collateral source rule would reduce 
deterrence). 
 65. In re Weiss, 839 A.2d 670, 677 (D.C. 2003) (explaining how deterrence depends on expected 
punishment). 
 66. See, e.g., Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1043 n.57 (Del. Ch. 
2006) (noting that limited liability leads to under capitalization). 
 67. See, e.g., Willcox v. Stroup, 467 F.3d 409, 413 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the incentive effect 
of possession rule in property is to reduce violence). 
 68. See, e.g., Wess v. Storey, No. 2:08-cv-623, 2011 WL 1463609, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2011) 
(explaining the incentive effect of contingency fees). 
 69. See, e.g., Sylvester v. Cigna Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 n.13 (D. Me. 2005); Lubin v. Farm-
ers Group, Inc., No. 03–03–00374–CV, 2009 WL 3682602, at *9 n.15 (Tex. App. Nov. 6, 2009); Ver-
mont v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1013 (Vt. 2003) (noting cases highlighting agency prob-
lems with attorney representation in class action cases). 
 70. Friolo v. Frankel, 28 A.3d 752, 775 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (discussing the incentive effect 
of fee-shifting statute on litigation). 
 71. See supra notes 55–69. 
 72. The procedural protections in Miranda were designed to prevent police from using coercive 
tactics to extract confessions.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (“The prosecution may not 
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of ac-
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change how those charged with administering legal rules do so with the 
ultimate aim of changing the cases that later courts hear.  For example, 
when courts correct a bad jury instruction they do not expect that they 
will see that same instruction in future cases. 
Attention to case selection also manifests itself in the differential 
scrutiny that courts employ when evaluating different types of cases.  
Judges appear to consider the average quality of cases in a class when de-
termining how much to scrutinize that class of cases.  For example, appel-
late judges have for a long time given habeas cases less scrutiny.73  A 
common rationale given is that prisoners have low opportunity costs 
from litigating because they are behind bars.74  As a result it is suggested 
habeas petitions might not be prescreened for quality by litigants as oth-
er suits may be.75  And so it makes less sense for trial courts to spend 
much effort closely examining the merits of each habeas petition. 
Another well-known example involves the slide between per se lia-
bility and the rule of reason in antitrust cases.  Judges impose per se lia-
bility when, after seeing a number of cases involving a particular com-
mercial practice, they discover that in most—if not all—the cases the 
defendant’s practice was anticompetitive.  The rationale for per se liabil-
ity is that the cost of further investigation of these cases is greater than 
the gain to absolving the rare innocent defendant of liability.76  In other 
words, the court has prejudged these cases based on past experience 
about the distribution of liable and nonliable defendants that engage in a 
practice.  Conversely, as courts start seeing more and more cases where a 
defendant has a plausible efficiency justification for a previous per se il-
                                                                                                                                      
tion in any significant way.  As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effec-
tive means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous 
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.  Prior to any questioning, the person 
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed.” (internal citation omitted)).  The Brady rule is designed to force the prosecutor to turn over 
exculpatory evidence, thereby changing the kinds of cases that come to trial (i.e., leaving only those 
cases in trial where the prosecutor did not have any exculpatory evidence). Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).  
 73. Habeas cases are often prescreened by a staff attorney at a court to reduce the burden of 
these cases on judges.  See Joseph L. Hoffman, Innocence and Federal Habeas After AEDPA: Time for 
the Supreme Court to Act, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 300, 302 (2012) (“The initial screening of federal ha-
beas petitions usually is conducted by court personnel known as ‘staff attorneys’ or ‘court clerks,’ 
working under the supervision of, and with subsequent review of their recommendations by, federal 
magistrates and federal district judges.”).  
 74. Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999) (“However, it is certainly conceivable 
that, because of significant potential gains and low opportunity costs, prisoners generally file a dispro-
portionate number of frivolous suits as compared to the population as a whole.”). 
 75. Dan Gustafson et al., Pro Se Litigation and the Costs of Access to Justice, 39 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 32, 37 (2012) (reporting results from a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center for the 
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, which found “the 
most common issues presented for judges and chambers staff were the poor quality of pleadings and 
submissions and the pro se litigants' lack of knowledge and skills to litigate their cases.  The next most 
common issues were frivolous cases, repeat filers, a rising caseload, and the demand pro se cases place 
on the courts.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 76. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1984). 
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legal practice, the court will switch back to the rule of reason standard 
that requires the court to consider the facts of each case before deciding 
liability.77 
A similar practice can be found in tort law.  Res ipsa loquitor can be 
premised on the idea that certain outcomes—such as finding a medical 
instrument inside the body of a patient after surgery—are so unlikely if 
the defendant took reasonable care that the court need not inquire into 
the actual care taken by the defendant before imposing liability.78  Negli-
gence per se can similarly be motivated.  That doctrine holds defendants 
liable for actions prohibited by statute or regulation.79  The decision of 
the legislature to prohibit a certain activity displaces the court’s inquiry 
into the reasonableness of the activity on the logic that the legislature or 
administrative agency’s decision has already decided that the activity is 
not justified in most (but perhaps not all) cases.  In other words, in torts 
cases courts rely on their own or the legislature’s judgments about the 
average case in a class to avoid probing inquiries into particular cases 
from that class. 
Courts not only consider the quality of cases, but also the quality of 
judgments in lower level tribunals in allocating attention across cases.  As 
noted, judges give deference to administrative agencies because of their 
expertise.80  Recently judges have observed the low quality of decision 
making by immigration judges and have begun to afford those courts less 
deference.81 
B. Courts are Rational 
That courts consider the context in which a case arises when deter-
mining the level of scrutiny they give that case should not be surprising.  
Given the demands on their time, judges have an incentive to carefully 
ration their attention across cases. 
Judges are not only subject to the law when they remove their 
robes, as many where litigators before they became judges.  As such, 
they understand the incentives that litigants have to bring and settle cas-
es.  Indeed, when judges were litigators, scholars who forecast the incen-
tive effect of legal rules assumed that they were rational.  It is unlikely 
that litigators lose this attribute when they become judges. 
                                                                                                                                      
 77. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[t]he rule of reason, ra-
ther than per se analysis, should govern the legality of tying arrangements involving platform software 
products.”); Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (abandoning the per se 
rule for vertical restraints on trade in favor of the rule of reason analysis). 
 78. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Per-
spective, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 413,  425–26 (1997). 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47 (discussing Chevron). 
 81. Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir 2005) (“At the risk of sounding like a broken 
record, we reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigra-
tion Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals…. The performance of these federal agencies is too 
often inadequate.  This case presents another depressing example.”).  
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Not only do judges have experience at behaving rationally, but they 
are selected, if anything, on how rational they are.  Judges who are ap-
pointed to their posts, certainly at the federal level and likely the state 
level, are chosen in part on capacity.  Finally, we have never heard any-
one suggest that judges are selected on the basis of being able to ignore 
information about case selection.  It is advertised that justice is blind, and 
thus judges are screened on their ability to avoid bias.  But the bias socie-
ty seeks to avoid in selecting judges concerns factors such as the race and 
gender of litigants that are not causally related to liability 82 and that, his-
torically, have attracted prejudgment that was race-based and incon-
sistent with equal protection. 
Elected judges might seem a different matter.  The process has been 
criticized for attracting personnel that appeal to populist sentiment ra-
ther than even-handed application of the law.83  While this may result in 
bias, e.g., a lower standard for convicting and a tendency toward harshly 
sentencing criminal defendants, these biases evince preferences for dif-
ferent legal rules, but not a tendency towards irrational application of ex-
isting rules and poor management of judicial resources.  Indeed, in the 
criminal context they may mimic the effect of rational courts rather than 
counter them.  A rational court would assume that prosecutors positively 
select cases based on guilt, increasing the tendency of the court to convict 
any defendant.  The policy biases introduced by elections could replicate 
these effects even if the elected judges are irrational. 
Finally, there is recent empirical evidence that casts doubt on criti-
cisms of elected judges.  Although elected judges produce lower quality 
decisions, they issue more decisions, and the latter effect may offset the 
former.84  Moreover, defenders of election suggest they are valued by 
voters and that alternatives, such as Missouri’s merit selection system, 
just change the nature of bias that judges have from favoring voters’ 
preferences to the state bar’s preferences.85 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A judicial system committed to efficiency must (1) ensure that par-
ties are sued when they cause injuries, and (2) ensure that trial courts ig-
nore case selection.  The first point is well known in academic literature.  
The second less so.  We note that trial courts are consistently asked to 
determine whether this defendant in this case is liable.  They do not 
                                                                                                                                      
 82. While certain groups may have higher rates of offending, often the association is mere corre-
lation rather causation including, nondemographic factors such as wealth or education.  
 83. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring). 
 84. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an 
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J. L. ECON. ORG. 290 (2010). 
 85. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MINN. L. REV. 6, 75 (2009); Chris 
W. Bonneau, A Survey of Empirical Evidence Concerning Judicial Elections, FEDERALIST SOC. (Mar. 
12, 2012), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/a-survey-of-empirical-evidence-concerning-
judicial-elections. 
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ask—and are not called upon to ask—whether a finding of liability or 
further investigation into the merits will enhance efficiency overall.  In 
evaluating motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions the ques-
tion is whether it makes sense to allow this case to proceed forward.  Has 
this plaintiff met his burden of production?  Legislatures and appellate 
courts, by contrast, often decide whether a legal rule creates good or bad 
incentives for similar future cases.  But such pronouncements do not end 
the matter.  The trial court still must implement the legal rule and in that 
implementation unavoidable consideration of incentive effects will tend 
to undermine the overall efficiency and equity of the legal rule. 
For example, an appellate court can say that negligence means the 
taking of cost-justified precautions.  Yet, as noted in Part II, this legal 
rule creates efficient care decisions if and only if trial courts applying the 
legal rule ignore how it alters the cases appearing in litigation.  And that 
is true even if we can somehow assure that all cases potentially involving 
liability are brought to trial. 
The appellate court might reverse the lower court for a failure to 
properly investigate the case—dismissing a case prematurely.  Notice, 
however, that the appellate court faces two significant hurdles in using 
review in this manner.  First, like the trial court the appellate court has a 
limited budget.  If it investigates the effort choice of the trial court all the 
time (using, say, de novo review of whether the underlying issue involves 
a factual or legal issue), the trial court will have an incentive to do what 
the appellate court prefers.  The trial court, say, will give each case the 
exact same treatment.  But, knowing that the trial court is complying 
with the appellate court’s preference, the appellate court will have an in-
centive not to be rigorous in its appellate review to save on resources.  
The same problem we identified between the trial court and the defend-
ant arises between the trial court and the appellate court.  In equilibrium 
the appellate court will not apply the standard of review consistently 
across cases and the trial court will not comply perfectly with what the 
appellate court prefers. 
Second, imagine a legal rule that no negligence cause of action can 
be dismissed as a matter of law.  Such a rule runs into either of two prob-
lems.  First, the trial court may not have the time to hear the merits of 
every single case, because they simply cannot comply with the dictate.  
Second, the trial court complies but this gradually delays the hearing of 
cases.  The cost of these delays to litigants at some point outweighs the 
benefit of more efficient incentives from the initial negligence rule. 
Our first conclusion, then, is that efficiency and court rationality 
conflict.  Our second conclusion is that rational courts coupled with ra-
tional actors generate inconsistency in the application of law.  In negli-
gence cases lower courts investigate the merits in some cases but not oth-
ers.  Jurors set a high evidentiary bar in some cases but not others.  
Courts defer to agency interpretation of statutes in some cases but not 
others, and so on. 
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Such fluctuations in the law, we submit, are inevitable.  The litera-
ture before us makes plain that any equilibrium where plaintiffs bear a 
cost of suit can result in discrimination in the filings of lawsuits.  Some 
plaintiffs are lucky and do not get sued while others are not so lucky.  
Our point is that even assuming the problem of inconsistent suits is 
solved the problem of inconsistent application of law remains. 
This problem does not arise (necessarily) from the heterogeneity in 
the political views of the judiciary.  Instead, where the legal system is op-
erating at its best and where plaintiffs file suit all the time, uncertainty 
will be generated if the court’s inferences regarding the behavior of po-
tential plaintiffs and defendants is to be consistent.  We have not been 
able to come up with a way to eliminate this uncertainty.  It is simply a 
cost of having legal rules implemented by rational courts. 
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APPENDIX: A GENERAL MODEL OF COURT RATIONALITY 
Here we present a game-theoretic model that generalizes the negli-
gence example given in Part II.  The game consists of two players: a trial 
judge and a potential defendant. The potential defendant has private in-
formation about the cost of precaution.  The trial judge’s strategy space 
consists of three possible actions.  First, at a cost K, he can investigate the 
merits of the case.  Denote this action I. Second, he can declare without 
investigation that the defendant is not liable.  Denote this action NL. 
Third, he can declare without investigation that the defendant is liable. 
Denote this action L. 
The defendant’s strategy involves a decision whether to take a pre-
caution or not.  Absent precautions, the plaintiff suffers an expected 
harm ph where p is the probability of the accident and h is the resulting 
harm.  To simplify the expositon, assume that all injured plaintiffs sue. 
Defendants come in two types.   With probability q the defendant 
has access to a precaution with cost c (the low cost type).  With probabil-
ity 1-q the defendant has access to a precaution with a cost C (the high 
cost type).  Assume that C>ph>c.  Thus, it is efficient for the low- cost 
type to take precautions and inefficient for the high-cost type to take 
precautions. The defendant’s payoff is the precaution cost if taken or the 
damages he expects to pay if precaution is not taken. Of course, the latter 
payoff depends on the choices made by the trial court. 
Given a negligence rule that requires conviction if ph is greater than 
the cost of precaution, the trial judge mistakenly exonerates when he 
fails to hold liable a low-cost defendant.  The trial judge mistakenly con-
victs when he holds liable a high-cost defendant.  The trial judge’s loss 
from a mistaken exoneration is m and his loss associated from a mistaken 
conviction is M.  Absent investigation the trial judge does not know the 
defendant’s precaution cost.  The trial judge’s belief that the defendant is 
a low precaution type is denoted by ߚ. 
 
Trial Court Can Commit 
 
The timing of the game when the trial court commits to an audit 
strategy  is as  follows.  The trial judge picks and commits to an audit 
strategy; that is, I, NL, or L, which the defendant observes.  Nature draws 
the defendant’s type.  The defendant decides whether to take precau-
tions or not.  The audit strategy is carried out and the payoffs realized. 
When solving the model notice that the high precaution type will 
never take care.   If the trial court holds the defendant liable as a matter 
of law, the damage payment is less than the precaution cost.  If the trial 
court investigates, the high cost precaution type who fails to take the pre-
caution will be found not liable.   Finally, if the trial court finds all de-
fendants not liable as a matter of law, the damage payment is zero and as 
a result it is not in the high precaution type’s interest to take precautions. 
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Now consider the following strategy profile.   The trial judge com-
mits to investigate, the low cost type takes the precaution if the trial 
court commits to investigate or commits to holding the defendant liable 
as a matter of law; he fails to take precautions if the trial court commits 
to holding the defendant not liable as a matter of law (because the trial 
court’s audit strategy is observed before the defendant acts, to construct 
the low cost defendant’s strategy we must define an action for each pos-
sible strategy of the trial court). The high cost type never takes precau-
tions no matter what audit strategy the trial court selects. The trial 
judge’s payoff in this strategy profile is –K.  Given the commitment to in-
vestigate the low cost type cannot deviate and increase his payoff.  If he 
fails to take the precaution, he suffers a loss of ph.  If he takes the pre-
caution, he suffers a loss of c, which is strictly less than ph.  Further, as 
argued above, the high cost type is always better off foregoing the pre-
caution. 
For this strategy profile to be an equilibrium we must check wheth-
er the trial judge can change his audit strategy and increase his payoff.  
Two deviations are considered.  First, the trial judge might commit to de-
claring everyone liable, the action L.  In that case, as noted, low-cost 
types will take precautions; high-cost types will fail to do so.  The trial 
judge will mistakenly convict for sure in the event a case arises (which 
occurs if the defendant draws a high cost—an event which happens with 
probability 1-q).  The expected loss from this strategy is thus (1-q)M. 
Second, the trial judge might commit to declaring everyone not lia-
ble, the action NL.  Lacking fear of a legal sanction, no defendant type 
will take precautions.  The trial judge will mistakenly exonerate some de-
fendants.  The expected loss from this audit strategy is thus qm. 
Together these two deviations suggest there exists an equilibrium in 
which the trial court commits to investigate in every case whenever 
K<min{qm,(1-q)M}, which we assume to be true. 
  
 The Trial Judge Cannot Commit to An Audit Strategy 
 
Now suppose that the trial judge makes the investigation decision 
after the defendant decides on his precaution.  This yields a signaling 
game wherein the occurrence of the accident might signal the defend-
ant’s type.  Unlike the previous case, the “perfect Bayesian” equilibrium 
can no longer involve separation of the defendant types.  Consider the 
possibility of a separating equilibrium where (1) the low cost type takes 
precaution, (2) the high type fails to take precautions, and (3) the trial 
judge declares the defendant who caused an accident not liable as a mat-
ter of law.  Given this proposed equilibrium, after an accident materializ-
es the trial court believes that the defendant had high costs for sure.  
Given this belief, the trial judge’s best response is to declare the defend-
ant not liable as a matter of law.  He is acting optimally given his beliefs.  
But we must ensure that neither defendant type as an incentive to devi-
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ate.  Yet, in the proposed equilibrium the low cost defendant type has an 
incentive to deviate since liability is not in the offering.  As a result the 
separating equilibrium is not a solution to the game. 
Next consider a pooling equilibrium as a candidate for a solution to 
the game.  In this proposed equilibrium, neither defendant type takes 
precautions and the trial judge investigates.  In this case the occurrence 
of an accident provides no new information to the trial judge as it is only 
an uninformative signal.  The trial judge’s beliefs are ߚ=q.  The trial 
judge’s payoff from investigation is –K. Given his beliefs and the assump-
tions we made earlier, investigation is the best response.  But we must 
also check for profitable deviations by each defendant type.  In this case 
(with investigation) the low-cost type has an incentive to deviate, to take 
the precaution and avoid liability.  Therefore, this pooling equilibrium is 
not a solution to the game. 
The equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.  Let the low cost type 
fail to take precautions with probability ߪ.  To randomize the trial judge 
must be indifferent between investigation and finding the defendant not 
liable as a matter of law.  For this to occur we need  
 
(1) ܭ = 	ߚ’݉ 
 
where ߚ’ is the posterior belief that the defendant has a low cost.  This 
posterior must be derived from Bayes rule and the equilibrium strategies 
of the defendant types. Doing so implies that 
 
ߚ′ = ఙ௤ఙ௤ା(ଵି௤).   
 
Solving, we get 
 
ߪ∗ = (ଵି௤)ఉᇱ௤(ଵିఉᇲ) 
 
 Likewise, the low cost type defendant must be indifferent between 
taking precautions and not.  That implies the trial court must investigate 
and find the defendant liable with probability µ, where µ satisfies c=µph, 
which means  
µ*=c/ph. 
This equilibrium leads to the results articulated informally in the 
main body of the Article.  The low cost type defendant only takes pre-
caution some of the time.  By contrast, as argued above, with commit-
ment to the audit strategy the defendant takes the low cost precaution 
every time.  In short, there is less deterrence absent commitment.  Fur-
ther, the application of law to the facts is probabilistic when the court 
makes its investigation decision after the defendant acts. 
